The views of linguistic analysts and objectivists are explored with regard to the question of interactionism. It is argued that the admission of a logical difference between explanation by cause and explanation by motive cannot disqualify causal explanations of human action, cannot be construed as challenging the competence of science, and cannot count against interactionism. It is also argued that objectivist programs for eliminating mentalistic concepts either implicitly admit interactionism or cannot distinguish relevantly between interactionism and parallelism. I wish to consider the possibility of a rapprochement between the accounts of mental life that are provided by adherents of linguistic analysis and of that kind of philosophy of science that speaks of the "eliminability" of mentalistic concepts. I should not wish to be misunderstood, however. For one thing, so-called linguistic analysts are by no means in agreement on the critical issues. For another, there may well be "linguistic" objections pressed against the programs of behaviorism, physicalism, objectivism that, rightly or wrongly, disallow any complete reconciliation. For a third, not all philosophers of science would subscribe to theories of the sorts mentioned. And for a fourth, the rapprochement intended affects no more than a part (however substantial) of the range of issues concerning relations between the mind and the body. I am interested primarily in isolating possible sources of disagreement that promise to be resolved as well as those that threaten to resist treatment more stubbornly; and in doing so, I wish to concede whatever may be conceded to the objectivist program and, at the same time, to challenge the program at a point that may be said to question, in its own terms, the adequacy of all such programs. I have arranged the discussion under two principal headings. 
1. Motives are sometimes causes and sometimes not causes. Greed, for example, may be both the reason for an action and the cause, or part of the cause, of an action. One's reasons for an action are not causes of the action; that is, reasons and causes are distinct and irreducible categories but what serves as a reason may serve as a cause. It is true that some linguistic analysts ( [6] , [8] ) hold that motives cannot be causes, in the strong sense that motive and cause are logically independent categories, but I do not find that they often address themselves to the question of whether what may be described under the category of a reason may also be described under the category of a cause. Melden, it is true, holds that to treat a motive as a cause is incoherent ( [6] , Ch. IX). But he also admits (possibly inadvertently) that a motive is the motive "for some action performed or performable by the agent" ( [6] , p. 77)1 and this clearly eliminates the alleged incoherence. Also, Peters, it is true, regards motives as "a particular class of reasons" and is very critical of the attempt to construe motives as causes and views causal theories of motivation as confused ( [8] , Ch. II). Nevertheless, a careful reading of Peters will show that he does not (and could not) disqualify, say, drive theory; he objects, really, not to causal explanations of the "directedness" of, or the motivational patterns of, behavior, but rather to incorporating such explanations "in the meaning of 'motive' " ( [8] , p. 40). Again, I take this to mean (though Peters may have no interest in agreeing with this) that what serves as a motive may also serve as a cause. On the other hand, a commentator like P. H. Nowell-Smith has no difficulty in holding that moral judgments concern "actions that are caused by characteristics that can be strengthened by praise and blame" ( [7] , p. 56), which suggests that linguistic analysis is by no means uniformly committed to Melden's or Peter's way of speaking. In the same spirit, Anthony Kenny explicitly remarks that "ca single state of affairs [may be] both object and cause of the same emotion" ([4], p. 75), which is in effect to say that, though two conceptual categories may be logically quite different, it is possible that one and the same "state of affairs" may be appropriately characterized in terms of both such categories.
To admit that what may be a reason may be a cause is not, however, to admit that whatever may be a reason may be a cause. If I designate the purpose of an action, I have not designated what may serve as a cause, even if a cause in some sense corresponding to the given purpose may be specified and even if an action to which we may assign a purpose may be causally explained. It is true that Peters allows causal explanations of actions only in so far as an action reduces to a mere happening, and thus departs from some rule-following model of action (a view which may surely be challenged) ( [8] , Ch. I). But a close reading of Peters shows conclusively that even he holds that since actions "can never" be specified "exhaustively in terms of movements of the body or within the body" ([8], p. 12), actions can never "be sufficiently explained in terms of causes, though, of course, there will be many causes in the sense of necessary conditions" ([8], p. 12). The upshot is that analysts who distinguish sharply between causes and reasons are not bound to deny (and ought not to deny) that causal explanations are relevant to understanding human actions; they hold at best only that, in that respect in which reasons are not causes, human actions cannot be adequately understood in causal terms alone. The only other possibility that arises is that, in science, what are described and explained causally are never mental states and events but only physical states and events. This may be true and, if it were, it would considerably complicate the characterization of the alleged quarrel between objectivism and interactionism. For then, it would not be true merely (for an objectivist) that mental states do not enter into causal relations with physical states but rather that mental states as distinct from physical states have no place in science. This would also bear on the strategy of challenging objectivism, since not only could it be said that interactionism is ruled out by the meaning of 'cause' but also that the very nature of what are admitted to be the facts and laws of science preclude interactionism. Now, this is an argument that threatens to become a mere quibble, though it is not a mere quibble to contrast the order of science (so construed) and the order of commonsense interactionism. That is, consider that, in ordinary discourse, not only are mental states said to enter into causal relations with physical states but also mental states are mentioned and described. The objectivist, who eliminates mental concepts (as far as science is concerned) does not even acknowledge (within his program) the existence of precisely what the interactionist holds a special thesis about. It seems fair to say, on this interpretation, that there can be no possible confrontation between the objectivist and the interactionist. But this is emphatically not to say that, in some sense that may be specified, the objectivist theory of science may be defended (or challenged) as providing a "true" or "correct" picture of science.
We may look at this issue in a somewhat different way. Brodbeck says, helpfully: "We say that mental anguish, for instance, anxiety, causes ulcers or that a bodily wound causes pain. Our common language is interactionist through and through. Let me, then, merely summarize the logic of the quarrel. Linguistic analysts characteristically insist that explanations of human actions cannot be given in causal terms. But they mean by this (in the best and most defensible versions) that explanation by motives is logically different from explanation by causes and that an understanding of human action calls for explanation by motives. They need not deny, and cannot deny, that causal explanations may be given of human action. To the extent that they concede that motives may be causes, linguistic analysts provide for interactionism. The objectivist concedes also that explanation by motive and by cause are logically distinct. He cannot then argue that causal explanation may replace the other and he cannot hold that the support of the difference between these two sorts of explanation counts, in itself, as a charge against the competence of science.
The fate of possible strategies against interactionism itself may be summarized in this way. Arguments based on criteriological considerations will be irrelevant, since if mental states are distinct from whatever serve as their public criteria, attention to the criteria alone will not bear on the causal question regarding mental states. If the relationship between indirect and direct descriptions of mental states is construed in causal terms, interactionism will be implicitly admitted. If the relationship between mental and physical states is construed as identity, interactionism will be implicitly admitted. If the relationship between mental and physical states is construed as empirical, noncausal correlations, information about such correlations will not yet bear on the causal question. Finally, if an objectivist denies that mental events enter at all in the causal explanations of science, no common ground can be provided for disputes between the two views. There do not seem to be any other relevant possibilities.
